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Abstract 
\We discuss some issues involved in modeling of complex systems composed of dynamically 
int,eracting agents. We describe a prototype of simulation environment INFOGEN created 
for modeling of such systems with the aim of evaluating strategies of enterprizes in the 
information economy, but applicable to general multiagent systems. The case study is 
presented along with the mathematical description of the multi-agent systems. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we describe an approach for modeling complex systems conlposed from in- 
dependerll entities called agents dynamically interacting between each other. The  original 
aim was to create a simulation tool for evaluation of strategies of enterprises in the new 
emerging informalion industry. This industry is developing now as a merger of telecommu- 
nications, computer industry and content provision. In this context the modelled system 
is information economy and agents are the enterprizes and business units involved i n  cre- 
ation, production and distribution of information products, networli providers, consumers 
of information products, government and regulation agencies. Such agents make decisions 
about consumption, transformation and exchange of information ancl other resources: es- 
paricl their produclion facilities, formulate their strategies in order t,o achieve specific aims. 
Tklesc decisions are taken in asynchronous and distributed manner. Agents may combine 
clifferent roles within economy, like content provision and delivery of information service. 
I f  carried far enough this project could involve creation of virtual information economy. 
At this point we have created the prototype of agent-based simulatior~ syst,ern INFOGEN 
and the methodological framework for its further development. This paper summarizes 
the \~o r l i  done so far and indicates some directions for further research. Our contribution 
goes beyond our original aim of modeling information economy. In fact,, lNFOGEN can 
11e used pot,entially for simulation of wide range of complex syst,ems with distributecl cle- 
cision making operating in changing and/or uncertain environment: for example financial 
markets. 
Modeling of information industry and, more generally, economic system undergoing 
rapid technological and structural change, poses the challenges which are not yet fully 
addressed by traditional economic modeling. Some of these modeling challenges consist 
in finding adequate approaches for treating nonstationarity and uncertairlty of economic 
environment, bounded rationality of economic agents, rich variety and complexity of dy- 
namic interrelations between different agents. 
;Vonstationarity. The large part of traditional economic theory and modeling is cen- 
tered around perfect markets in the state of equilibrium. In such systenis the operat,ion of 
rnarliet forces smooth out disturbances introduced by uncertainty and randoril events arid 
leads t,he system to ergodic state of equilibrium. In case of rapid technological ckia~lge this 
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is 110 longer the case because relatively small disturbances and decisions with small in-irne- 
diate impact can have self-magnifying properties due to  the positive feedbacks present in 
1.11(: system (technologies wit,h increasing returns) [4]. This leads to noi~ergodicity of tlie 
systern which requires from modeller the shift of the emphasis from stationary to  transient 
behavior. 
Uncertczinty. The lack of ergodicity increases importance of adequate treatment of 
uncertainty present in the system. There are two levels of uncertainty present in the 
system. There is external uncertainty represented by demand patterns, lechnological 
change and differend kinds of random perturbations. Internal uncertainty is due to  111e 
fact that each agent takes decisions without full knowledge about states and actio~is of 
other agents. Thus, both models of uncertainty and behavior of ec:onomic agents under 
uncertainty should be included in the system. 
Complexity. Traditional economic modeling deal with systems composed from fairly 
liomogeneous agents with similar behavior patterns. We needed instead the capabilities 
t,o model rich variety of relations where the same agents can compete in one field and 
collaborate in another overlapping field, assume different combinations of industry roles, 
possess different knowledge about the state of the whole system. Tliis complexity leads 
to the multitude of positive and negative feedbacks in the systern which under different 
values of  systen-i parameters can lead to  different equilibriums, arid even chaot.ic bcliavior. 
Even without chaos the presence of multiple equilibria leads to  ~a t~as t rophic  behavior, i.c. 
in certain points the system abruptly switches between different equilibria with arbitrarily 
small change of system parameters. Important objective here cvould be to  define regions 
of st,ability in the space of the system parameters. 
Bo.1~nded r.utionality. Traditional economic theory assumes tha.t econo~nic agents are 
perfectly rational and their behavior is governed by maximization of certain utility func- 
tion. Sonstationarity, uncertainty and complexity makes this assumptiori too restrict,ive 
iu many cases. Besides these traditional models we included in our system some more 
realist'ic models of agent behavior which assume the bouded rationalit,? of agents, i.e. that 
t>hcir tlccision actions result from the set of heuristics which 1.ar.y accordi~ig to changing 
of informatior1 patterns, environment and goals [3]. Such heuristics arc: constantly being 
evaluated against obtained results and new heuristics are generated. 
Our objective was to  create a system capable of modeling these features of informa- 
!.ion economy. In order to  achieve this we draw upon recenl, advances in methodology of 
operations research, simulation, computer science and economic rnocleling. In particular, 
simulation models of asynchronous systems were developed in the theory of Discrete Event 
Dyriarnic Systems (DEDS) together with interplay between simulation and optirriization 
[2, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24, 25, 261. Decision making principles in the presence of uncer- 
lainty were considered in the field of stochastic programming [6, 8, 12, 14, 10: 18, 20, 221. 
Dynamic behavior of systems composed from interacting agent's was studied within t,lie 
frarriework of evolutionary approach [ l ,  5, 4, 9, 21, 231. Related work in computational 
ecoriorriy and market-oriented programming resulted in creation of several tools for dis- 
tributed resource allocation in financial and other fields [13, 27, 28, 291. 
The  rest of the paper is organized as follows. Architecture of the syst,em INFOGEN 
is described in section 2. Section 3 is dedicated to  a case study of conipetition between 
the producers of an innovative product. Section 4 contains the mathematical description 
of' mult,iagent system which underlies INFOGEN. 
Architecture of the system INFOGEN 
INFOC4EK stands for INFOrmation economy modeling through aGENt programming. In 
this section we provide an informal description of INFOGEN architecture. It is a discrete 
event simulator which consists of three main components: resources, agen,ts and market. 
It simulates the evolution of the economy as distributed transformation of resources by 
agents and exchange of resources through market. The mathematical description of the 
general multiagent system which underlies INFOGEN can be found in section 4. 
2.1 Resources 
These are t,he elementary entities from which the system is composed. Or, t,hey can be 
viewed as an alphabet in which the system is described. In our t,ermiriology we consider 
'resources" any commodity or entity which is exchanged, satisfied, manufactured or in 
arly other way changed by economic agents relevant to modeling purposes. Thus, besides 
resources in the economic sense of the word other examples of resources are money, all 
liinds of products, services and needs. In our system resources are divided in five types: 
money, input respource, output resource, internal resource and final cleman,d. 
Money. This is obligatory resource which is always present in the system and wliich 
flow is treated separately from flow of other resources. This is due to its ecorlomic function 
of' exchange and because performance of agents is often measured iri money terms. 
Input  resources. These are the resources which are used by agents for creation of 
products and services and satisfaction of needs. For example, in the case of the agent 
representing an Internet provider one of the input resources may be (,he lines which he 
leasts from a telephone company. In case of the agent representing an Internet user some 
of tlie input resources are fixed local phone service and the Internet connection. Input 
resources are bought by an agent at the market and may be stored. 
Output  resources. These are the products and services into which agents transfornl 
input resources ancl which are offered to the market. For example. for Internet provider an 
output resource is t.he capacity to provide an Internet connectio~i of given quality, ~vhile 
for telephone company the output resource is the capacity to provide a phone connection. 
12rom these exarr~ples it is clear that the output resources for one agent are the input 
resources for some other agents. Output resources can constitute the qfers to the market 
ancl t.hey can be stored. 
Internal resources. These are resources which are possessed by agents and are 
necessary for transformation of the input resources into output resources. Examples of 
such resources are qualified manpower or production capacities. For example for Internet 
provider his Internet node would be his internal resource, for 1rit.ernet user it would be 
liis personal computer and specialized software, for a phone company i t  is her network. 
Input resources can be expanded and otherwise developed and they should be subjected 
to maintenance. Aloney and input resources are needed for both maintenance and devel- 
opment. 
Final demand and needs . These are the final resources which drive the economic 
activity of tlie system. They are not transformed or exchanged in the syt,em and coristitute 
needs and demands of the end user. What are the final resources very much depend on 
t t ~ c l  pllrpose of the modeling. Suppose, for example, that we model the penetration of 
t tie Iieav telecomrnunication voice service, like voice over Internet. Then the final resource 
may he just "demand for voice over Internet" represented by some expert prediction. 
On the other hand we might be interested in looking closer how this demand is formed 
according to  some hypotheses about behavior of customers and price and quality structure 
of competing voice services. In this case the final resource would be "thc need for voice 
corrimunication" measured, for instance, by distribution of time per day for various types 
of customers. Input resources in this case may be "fixed phone connection", "mobile 
~ ) l ~ o n e  connection", "Internet connection" and "other means". 
This resource structure is very flexible and can be easily modified b. reassigning re- 
sources to  different types and aggregati~nldisa~gregation according to  modeling needs. 
2.2 Agents 
Agents transform and exchange resources described previously. We developed generic 
agent structure which can be specialized in the rich collection of agents by specifying 
agent parameters for particular purposes. This structure permits to  model a variety of 
ecoriomic actors from enterprizes to  individual users. Such flexibility is irriportant because 
\ve needed the capabilities to  model agents which combine the multitutlc of indust,rv roles. 
Roles. In the rapidly evolving information economy one of the most important issues 
for rie\r~ly emerging company as well as for established industry leader is which industry 
roles t,o assume. Should established fixed network provider go into providing Int,ernet 
service, or form a strategic alliance with provider of cable television? Thorough analysis 
of' information iridustry roles can be found in [7] .  After preliminary arialvsis we under- 
stood that all iridustry roles except regulatory roles can be represented in the alphabet of 
resources described above, i.e. as transformation of specific set of resources into another 
set of resources and their exchange. From this resulted that the agents t,hen-lselves can be 
rcpr(:serit,ed in terms of this alphabet. 
r 7 1 l ~ u s ,  the generic agent structure in our sys te~n  consists of resoui.cc .sr:ts, trnr~.sfornscl~- 
tion J:nnctions and strategies. 
Resource sets. There is the total set of resources for all system. Each agent is cliar- 
act'erized by four subsets of this set, i.e. set of input resources, set of output, resources, 
sct of internal resources and set of needs. Input resources are all resources which are 
transformed by this part,icular agent into internal and output resources and in need sat,- 
isfaction. For partucular agents generated from the general structure some of these set,s 
rnay be empty. At each time moment the state of an agent is characterized by available 
money and internal resources and by stocks of input and output resources. 
Transformation functions. There are four sets of such funct,ioris in tlie general 
agent. structure: p ~ ~ o d u c t i o n  funct ions,  development functions, m,aintcnnn,ce functions and 
satis.factiorz functions. Productiorz functions tell how much of moriey, int,errial and input, 
resources are needed for production of the given quantity of the output resource. They 
11a\.e tlie following structure: 
where v, is the volume of specific input or internal resource or money, zl ,  is the volume of 
the output resource and a are production parameters. In the simplest case these functions 
could be linear, however we are specifically interested in case of increased returns and 
economies of scale. In such case $ ( a ,  .) is concave function which may as~l~ript,oticaly tend 
to lineal. with increasing argument. The  simplest case of such functior~ is t lie following: 
where the case when a2 > a3 describes increasing returns and a2 < 03 corresponds to 
tliniinisliing returns. 
All other types of transformation functions have t h e  same s t ructure  ( 1 )  as production 
functions. Development Junctions describe amounts of input resources arid money neces- 
sa.ry for expanding production capacities for given amount.  !\faintenancc Junctions define 
amount of money and input resources necessary for maintenance of internal resources arid 
st,ocks of input and ou tpu t  resources. Satisfaction functions define amount of money and 
input resources necessary for satisfaction of a need. 
Strategies. Strategies are  actions which agents undertake in order to  achieve specific 
aims. Strategies depend on amount of money and other resources available t.o a n  agent and 
on information available on the  states and strategies of other agents. 'The general agent 
st,ructtirc includes three types of interrelated strategies: pricing strategies, deucloprncnt 
strategies and purchasing strategies. All these strategies in some cases may be derived 
by solvirig dynamic optimization problems (see section 4) .  In more complex cases such 
strategies can be  based on principles of a d a p t i v i t , ~  and bounded rationality. 
Pricing strategies define t h e  price which a n  agent offers for its output  resources (prod- 
ucts and services). In one our case study we implementetl the  principles of bounded 
rationality as follows. Each agent had a set of several strategies: keep t;he market  price, 
increase t,he price or decrease the  price based on previous history. On each s tep  an agent, 
coultl choose from one of such strategies according t o  probabilities wliich were updated 
according t o  their performance in terms of income and revenue, similar t,o t,he theory of 
learning automata .  
Dc uelopnlent struiegies. If demand exceeded production capacities a n  agent can choose 
beliveen increasing t h e  price or expanding production capacities. Development strategies 
govcrn such expansion taking into account that  newly added capacities are  becoming 
operational after some delay. 
PUT-chasing strategies. These strategies are employed by t,he agents for selection of 
offers for required input resources present in the  market .  T h e  simplest strategy is, of 
course, to  ctioose the  oiFer with smallest price. We take into account, however, tliat 
lor real economic agents the  price considerations are not nccessaril?; unique ancl allow 
cl~ston-iers to  migrate between offers with different price with some tlyriarnics clependciit 
or1 ot,hcr att.ributes of an  offer. 
.At ttiis moment we implemented some basic set of strategies which is in t h e  process 
of expansion. 
Specific agents are generated from this general agent struct,ure hy spctcii'>-ing its ele- 
ments. Here a re  some types of t h e  agents with which we experimented. 
Production agent. This agent puts on the  market products and s e r ~ ~ i c e s  producing 
them on productiori capacities using input resources bought on the  marlcet: but do  not 
have final needs to  satisfy. These agents further differ by their set of strategies. 
End uscr ugent. This  agent satisfies the  final needs by purchasing products and services 
on the  niarket. This  agent is further characterized by capability to  substi tute different, 
products t o  satisfy t h e  same need. For example, the  need for voice c o m m ~ ~ n i c a t i o n  ~a1.i 
t)e satisfied by fixed phone, mobile phone or voice over Internet. 
Pure supplier. This  agent has only output  resource which supplies for t h e  price derived 
from the  expert  estimates. This agent is useful to model supply of important  product 
which flow we do not want t o  describe in much detail due  to  modeling purposes. One  
c,sainple is the  regulatory commission which distributes frequerices for broadcast, traris- 
rliission. 
2.3 Market 
LIarlict is i h e  environment in which agents operate. Each period of t ime agents which 
p~~ot lucc  ou tpu t  resources put  their oflers on the  market. Each offer consists of quanti ty 
and price of specific resource. Agents which are  customers for t h e  input resources go t o  the  
rilarket and choose between offers. For the  case when demand exceeds supply t h e  system 
has the  set of rules which distr ibute available supply between customers. Producing agents 
may then decide to  increase the  price for t h e  next period and/or  t o  expand production 
capacities. There  is t h e  set of balancing mechanisms which a re  needed because unsatisfied 
demand of one agent, may result in decreasing of its offer t o  the  market which in turn  may 
rcs l~l t  in diminishing satisfaction of demand of other agent. Ono possibility is to use t h e  
ger~c,ral izat ions of Walras tatonnement process [29]. 
3 Case study: competition of producers of an inno- 
vative product 
In order t o  illustrate our modeling approach we present in this section a simple but  
illuminating case study. Consider a market which caters for satisfact'ion of some need of 
pool of end users. At some point as  t h e  result of t,echnological innovation appears some 
ot,her product,  or several products which can satisfy the  same need, hu t  in sorne new way 
or sornc new aspect of it .  Some companies, old or new, s tar t  to devclop these products 
arid offer them to the  market .  Doing so they can adopt different clcvelopment and market 
strategies. It is important  t o  understand which parameters of such strategies are  crucial 
for success. 
Therc  are  many examples of such situation in the  present t,cchnological reality. Con- 
sider, for example, t'he recent developments in provision of voice telecornniunications. 'I'kie 
rieed of the  end users t o  be satisfied is the  need of remote comrrlunicai,ion hy voice. There  
was c:sial>lished marliet with traditional product which is fixed telephony. Then appea.red 
11cw services like mobile telephony and very recently the  possibility of voice through In- 
tcrnet .  Xnot.her cxarnple is video on demand versus more t~raclit~iorial film clistrihl~i,iori 
like cil~c:nia and video rentals. Still another example is tlie competi t iori bet\veen di rerent  
Irit('rr~ct providers which compete between themselves and  against tra,dilional means of 
provisio~-I of irlformation services. 
111 n.1lat follows we present a simplified description how this situation can be  modeled 
\vith t,he help of INFOGEN and some results of experimentation. Let us follow t h e  
clescription of INFOGEN architecture presented in t h e  previous section. 
Resources. In t h e  simplest case we have five resources in thc  system: money. end 
user need, traditional product,  innovative product (may be more t.hen orie): production 
capability of innovative product.  
Agents. There  are  three types of agents present in t h e  system: crid users. producers 
of inriovat,i\~e product,  suppliers of traditional product. 
Enrl users. They  operate on four of t h e  resources defined above: end user need, two in- 
put scsources (traditional product and innovative product)  and money. Their  production 
rurict,ion describes how fixed amounts of traditional and innovative products satisfy their 
noecl. t , a k i ~ ~ g  inlo accour~t  t h e  possibility to  substit,ute one product hy anot,her. 'Their 
strategy corisists of two components: maximization of need satisfaction given an-~oun t  
oC money available each period and purchasing strategy according to  whicl~ they selcct 
between offers of producers of innovative product. 
Producers of innovative product. In the simplest case they operate on three resources: 
money, production capacity as internal resource and innovative product as out,put re- 
source. In this case the only resource which is used for expansion of prodrlction capacit,y 
is rrloneJr. For more detailed modeling production capacities may be disaggregated arid 
input resources may be added for both production and capacity expansion. l'roduct,ion, 
dcvelopment and maintenance functions of these agents describe l i o ~  much money arid 
production capacit,y is needed for production of the given quantity of innovative prod- 
uct and how much money is needed for production capacity espansion and maintenance. 
These agents have the pricing strategy and productiori expansion strategy. We modeled 
several types of these agents which differ by their strategy sets. 
Supp1iei.s of traditional product. In the simplest case this agent operate only one 
resource: traditional product which is the output resource for him. It has infinite stock 
of this resource which he supplies to the market for given price which may vary between 
time periods. In more involved modeling we might be interested in possible strategies 
of this t,ype of agents for countering the invasion of the new product,, i11 this case i t  is 
liecessary to specify the structure of this agent in more detail. 
We used INFOGEN for different experiments with this model. We have found that the 
behavior of the system very much depends on the set of strategies atlopt,ed by differend 
producers of innovative product and on parameters of such strakgies. System may tend 
to  ecluilibrium in which some producers will conquer certain market shares, while oth- 
ers will perish. There are multiple equilibria which are chara~t~erizcd by different sets of 
survived agents and the system may switch between different such equilibria in discontin- 
uous faskiion, i.e. with arbitrarily small change of strategy paramet,ers. In sorrie cases [.he 
system can exhibit chaotic behavior with different producers ha.ving their rna.rket shares 
oscilla,t,e widely. 
Two sets of experiments are presented here in order to  illust,rate t,llese points. The 
fisst set is cornprised by Figures 1-4 (see the end of the paper). In this case there are two 
identical producers of innovative product which differ by their market strategies. The  first 
agerit sest its price independently selecting on each step frorn several adaptjive strategies 
according to  their past performance with respect to  revenue maximization. The  second 
agerit have the information about the price adopted by the first agent and varies his 
price around the price of the first agent again according to  adaptive strategies. On these 
figures the upper straight line represents the maximal possible value of the rnarket for t,he 
innovat,i~-e product, i.e. in the case when all traditional product is subst,itut.ed. The  lower 
horisontal line represents the half of the maximal market value, this is the reasonable 
rllarket share for each agent since they are identical. The  thick upper curve represents 
tlie tot.al market for the innovative product and two lower intertwined curves represent 
revenues of individual agents. 
Figures 1-4 represent various patterns of market evolution depending or1 the param- 
eters of the market strategies of the agents. On Figure 1 we have the total collapse of 
the market for the innovative product followed by near collapse with rebour~d on Figure 
2 and the victory of the innovative product on Figure 3.  Figure 4 represent the case of 
chaotic behavior with survival of both traditional and innovative  product,^ and oscillations 
of' nlarket shares both between new and traditional products and bet,wcen manufa.cturcrs 
of the nc\v product. 
I<xample of discontinuous switch between different equilibriurn point,s is presented on 
Figures 5-8. Here again we have two identical agents this time defining their market 
strategies independently. They differ, however, by their initial market share and by tlie 
ct~pability of rapidly, or decisively react to observed revenue fluct,uatioris measured by 
one of the strategy parameters which we call reaction parameter. In reality such greater 
flexibility ma? be caused by larger innovation capacity. The  largcr rcaction parameter 
the larger variations can introduce the agent in its prices. In all four cases the first agent 
has larger initial market share and the value of reaction parameter fixed t,o 0.0c5. On the 
Figure 5 t,he second agent has the same value of reaction parameter as the first agent 
and the larger initial market share proves to be decisive: the first agent quickly conquers 
the whole market. While the second agent increases its reaction paramcter it survives 
longer and longer and finally between values 0.066657 and 0.066638 the system changes 
ecluilibrium in a discontinuous (catastrofic) fashion: the second player starts to  win the 
ivhole market share (Figures 6 and 7) which continues with the further increase of the 
reaction parameter (Figure 8). 
4 Mat hemat ical description of underlying mult ia- 
gent system 
I ,  1 his section contains more precise mathematical description of rr~riltiagent system wt~ich 
ulideslies INFOGEIV described in section 2. It should be read kcepirig in rliind inforrnal 
csplanatioris o l  this section. 
4.1 Definition of resources 
We consider the set W of n resources u;, i = 1 : n. Each of these resources car1 be 
characterized by its quantity z;, and the vector of other attributes u; = (c i l :  ..., .u;,,). 
Some of the components of these vectors can be continuous, while ot,hers can be discrete. 
For example, among these attributes can be quality for infornlation rcsorlrces, or paclict, 
loss for corlriect,ions in data  network. The values of these cl~~antit ies I~c>long t,o specified 
sclt,s: 
2i € zi, L1i € K,  
Ofteri t,here are additional constraints on the possible values ol cluantit,ics and attributes 
which can be expressed in the following way: 
( 2 ; ;  I ! , )  E A: = 1 : Mi, C Zi x I/; ('3) 
We treat money here as special resource uo E W which has empty at,t,rihut,e, thus moncy 
is characterized by couple (zo, 0)  where zo is the amount of moncy. 
4.2 Structure of resource space 
The space of resources can be associated with oriented resource yruph (LC'.  A) .  'The set LC' 
of vertices of this graph coincide with the set of resources while the set of oriented arcs 
A C CL' x C1l' defines resource transformations. Let us explain this in rrlore detail. 
For each u, E W let us denote by W: the set of all vertices from which oriented arcs 
point to  v, and by W,- the set of all vertices to  which oriented arcs point from u,: 
Ll/? = {uj : ( v J :  u;) € A )  WF = {uJ : (u;, uj) € A )  
'l'lie set ~JV: is called consumption set for resource u; because it is constituted Irorrl all 
resorlrces lvllich are consumed in the process of "production" or "t,rar~sfosmation" of re- 
source v; a ~ i d  t,he set M/;- is constituted from all resources for which translormatiori the 
rosorlrcc u, is needed. 
The resources u; for which W: = 0 are called primary resources. Ttlcy are not t,ralis- 
formecl within the system and are taken from outside. As far as niodclirig of' i~ifornlation 
i ~ l d u s ( , r ~  is concerned, the examples of such resource are land or rrianpower. 
The resources ui for which W r  = 0 are called final resources. Such rcsollrces are not 
used in further transformations within the system. In our case examples of such resources 
are needs of the end users and the government. 
Resources u; for which W,f # 0 are produced or transformed within the systeni. With 
cach such resource is associated the production function: 
ivhich defines the quantity z, and attributes v, of resource u, which can be obtained 
from resources belonging to consumption set taken in quantities z, with attributes 1 ; .  
Sometimes production function can be approximated by a linear function with respect to  
quantities: 
where c(u; ,  vj) are some coefficients which depend on the attributes of respective resources. 
More oft,en this is monotonously increasing concave function of quantities which reflects 
c-conom;y of scale. 
M;it,li each production function (3) is associated expenditure function whicli defines the 
tilnor~rit of money u; necessary to  purchase the resources (zi, u , ) ~ , ~ ~ :  
Often t,his is a linear function of resource quantities. 
4.3 Role layer 
Roles define relations and structures on the production graph defined above ancl are 
a.ssociatec1 with different operations which can be applied to resources. We consider here 
only transformation roles. Such roles are responsible for transformation of one resources 
into others. Many structural and infrastructural roles of information industry fit into 
this category, among them information and information service production, provision ancl 
brokerage roles. 
Each such role is associated with some subset B of vertices of production graph, B c 
I/V. Different resources belonging to  B have different functions within this subset. Sorne 
of them are principal resources, others depend on principal resources. Let us consider, 
for example: information production role, like production of movies. In this case there 
is priricipal resource which is movie and secondary resource which is promotion material 
ahout movie. According to  different functions of resources belonging to the subset B of 
a partic~ilar ole this role can be subdivided into subroles, some sltbroles are dedicated to 
productiori proper, while other subroles are dedicated to  maintenance of relations with 
c~~~storners /s~tppl iers .  
3lIorc. formally. let. us consider the set R of transformation roles, 
\Ve assume that there is a set w & W of principal resources and collection of subsets CVk, 
k. = 1. ..., A'. Each transformation role is associated with a suhsc~t CVL. Suppose that I/I/k 
is t hc set of principal resources arnong Wk: 
\Ve assume that the collection of sets CV~ constitutes a parlition of sct I$' 
4.4 Agent layer 
Agents constitute independent entities which combine one or more transformation roles 
and form supplier/consumer relationships with each other. 
Let us define this notion formally. By P we denote the set of agents, 
Each agent can be associated with some subset of transformation roles R, C R. Recall 
lhat for each role r ,  correspond some set of resources W,. 
4.5 Supplier/consumer graph 
Resource graph and mapping between roles and agents permit to define supplier/consumer 
graph. This graph plays fundamental role in multiagent system. It is oriented graph (P. D) 
with vcrt ices which coincide with the set of agents P and set of oricl~ted arcs D C P x P. 
FOI (~i~c11 irertice p, of this graph let us define the set of all rc.sources R ,  produccd by 
corrcsporiding agent: 
and by R' the set of all corlsumed resources for this agent: 
Similar to  rc'source graph for each vertice p, let us define the sets of prcclecessors P,f and 
children P,- : 
The meaning of this structure is the following. The  vertices correspond to  production 
and/or transformation of different resource sets. Oriented arcs point from suppliers to  
producers/consumers. Resources flow in the direction of these arcs and money flows in 
the opposile direction. Thus, the set P;f is the set of all agents which supply resources 
needed for production and transformation of resources from R i  and the set P,- is the set 
of all agents which consume resources from R;. There should be the following relation 
between this graph and resource graph: 
wliich nlc:ans simply that for all resources produced by a agent p, the set of resources 
needed for its production is among the set of all resources produced h;. suppliers of this 
agent. 
4.6 Market layer 
This  layer describes relations between agents as they are  unfolded in tirnc. They are 
perceived as  flow of resources along the  supplier/consumer graph. 
4.6.1 Time structure 
Tlie syst,ern is evolving in discrete t ime t  = 0 , 1 ,  .... T h e  units of this tirrie can corresporid 
t,o different units of real t ime,  from months to years. T h e  consu~ner/supplier  graph de- 
scribed in the  previous section depends on time. This  is done in order tjo describe such 
phenomena as emergence of new agents, union of different agents into one agent,  change 
of consurner/supplier relatioris described by oriented arcs of this graph,  change of roles 
played by clifFerent agents: 
4.6.2 State  of the  system 
-1't1(: s ta te  of t.he systern S ( t )  a t  tirne t  consists of the  states of all agents: 
r 7 1 he s t a te  of a agent p; consists of the  following components: 
\\.here 
r r , ( / )  - current available resources; 
(1, ( 1  1 - current moriey supply; 
@ , ( t )  - current production/investment strategy; 
II:(t) - current consumer contracts; 
II, ( t )  - current supplier contracts; 
111 followir~g subsections \ire describe in more detail each of ttiese co111ponc:rits. 
4.6.3 Current available resources and money flow 
'The vector of all resources owned by agent a t  the  beginning of period 1 is described by 
its quanti ty and  at tr ibutes:  
u!;(t) = { ( z L J ( t ) ,  v i j ( t ) ) ,  j : vj E R;) 
1,et us 1.ccal1 tha t  money is included in t h e  set of resources and have index 0. i.e. vo 
denotes money. PVe could manage it in our model as any other resource. However, due  
t,o specific economic function of money we prefer to  treat  it separatelj. and dcriote the  
current amount  of moriey available to agent p, as cl,(t). In case if vo E 0, we have 
Usually there are some constraints on the  possible values of resource-s. for exarnple in 
tllc inost cases tllcy should be  nonnegative. Generally, adi~iissible scts I ;  are given such 
that  
4.6.4 Current production/investment strategy 
1,c.t 11s c,orisicler again production functions from (3) .  We want to  generalize their clefinition 
to include delay phenomena. For example, it takes some time to train human resources 
ancl acquire necessary technological capabilities. Generally, some resources are produced 
within the same time period, while other resources become operational after some time 
after initial investment in terms of money and other resources is made. Similarly, some 
types of neecls of end users may be satisfied for some time after acquisition of certain 
resources is made. PVe describe this phenomena by allowing the amount and attributes 
of resources produced at  time t to  depend on resources from corisumption set at cr~rrent 
h ~ ~ d  previous periods of time: 
where A;. is the depth of the memory of the system which can differ for different resources. 
IIere we allo\rl procluction function depend explicitly on agent p, .  
The production/investment strategy Q,( t )  has duratiorz which lasts f'roin time t to tirrle 
f ,  + t Q  \which can be different for different strategies. At each time r : t < r < t + tQ i t  
involves decision Q, ( t ,  r ) :  
Each such decisiori consists of decisions Qlk( t ,  r )  for all resources which belong to produc- 
ti011 sct fl, of the agent p,: 
Each resourcc strategy Q t k j t ,  r )  consists of two parts: product,ion part Syk(l, r )  and con- 
sumption part S:(t, r) .  Production part is simply quantity and attrihutes of resourcc UL 
\vhich is planned at  time t to  produce at  time r :  
ivhile coiisumption part consists of all resources necessary to  cor~sumc at time r in order 
i o protlr~cc i.esourcx!s defined by production strategy: 
Obviously. production strategy Q;(t,r) and consumption strategy S:(t, r ) ,  t 5 r 5 L a  
are connected with production functions (6). 
From definition of production strategy follows that the total amount 7' of resource u, 
- ? 
with attributes v, needed to  be consumed in order to  execute the product~on st,rategy at 
i i r~le i can be expressed as follows: 
In case of [none? -6 which has empty attribute this expression becomes: 
4.6.5 Current consumer contracts 
This describes relations between agent p, and i ts  suppliers from t h e  set P,f ( t )  which is 
the  set of its predecessors on consumer/supplier graph. A contract q is dcfined 11y the  
follo~ving quantities: 
where 
i, - the  number of consumer agent; 
3, - t h e  number of supplier agent; 
k, - the  number of supplied resource; 
t i  - the  t ime of the  contract beginning; 
t l  - t h e  t ime of the  contract ending; 
( z , ( T ) ,  v q ( r ) ,  ~ ~ ( 7 ) )  - respectively quantity, at tr ibutes and unit price of resource l /kv  
which agent pjq supplies t o  agent piq a t  t ime r .  In case if contract involves borrowing 
molley. i.e. kq = 0 then zj,(r) = 0 and ~ , ( r )  means t,he arnount of money to  re turn  a t  
t.ime period r .  
Thus.  t,he results of execution of contract q a t  t ime T are  t h e  following: 
- agent ptg receives from agent pjq resource vk, with quanti ty n r~d  at tr ibutes ( z , ( r ) ;  v , ( r ) ) :  
- agent pj, receives from agent piq amount of money ~ , ( r ) z , ( r ) .  
'l'he set of all contracts present in the  system a t  t ime t is denoted h: Q ( t ) .  
T h e  iiow of resources follows direction of arcs in consumer/supplier graph,  tvhile the  
ilo~v of money is opposite t o  t>his direction. In order for contract q E Q ( t )  t o  be admissible 
i l  sliould satisfy a set of constraints, for example 
l /X ,  E RJq 
i.v. resource vk, is among resources produced by agent pIv. T h e  set of c,onsumer contracts  
for agent p, is the11 defined as t h e  set of all contracts which have p, as consumer agcnt 
arid are active a t  t ime t :  
This set defines t h e  set of arcs in consumer/supplier graph: 
( p , . p , )  E D ( t )  * 3q E fl:(t) : j = j, 
T h e  following expression defines the  total amount zk of resource. l / k  with a t t r i b ~ ~ t e s  1.x 
received by agent p, from execution of contracts: 
Some contracts involve borrowing money. T h e  total  amount Z;  of money borrowed during 
t ime period t equals: 
T h e  amount  of money zg spent on debt servicing equals 
dnd thc  total  a n ~ o u ~ i t  of money zgC spent by agent p, on contracts not involving borro~virig 
equals 
zO = C ~ q ( t ) z , ( t )  ( 15) 
9 , €n; t ( t ) , k ,#0  
4.6.6 Current supplier contracts 
Following definition (10) of contract from the  previous section, t.he set of currerit supplier 
contracts n ; ( t )  for agent p, includes all contracts q E Q ( t )  which are active at t ime 2 and 
contain agent p, as supplier agent: 
T h e  following expression defines the  total amount z k  of resource vi, \vit,li a t t r ibutes  ck 
supplied by agent p, in accordance with contracts: 
\Ve are  interested here in agents which do  not lend money. T h c  total amount  of money 
,-; received by such agent from fulfilling supplier contracts equals 
4.7 Flow of resources 
Flow of resources is governed by supplier/consumer contracts and production strategies. 
,4clmissiblc coritracts should coriform with production stratcgies i r ~  such a way tha t  for 
each agent arid each resource amount of supplied resource plus amount of cor~sumed 
rc3sourcc should not exceed amount of received resource plus amount of produced resource 
aiicl current available resource. Taking into account (8),(12),(17) we obtain the  follo~vir~g 
equality for every agent p,: 
This equation holds for all resources uk which belong to  the  union 01' sets 0, and 0:. If 
some resource belongs to  R:, but  does not belong t o  Q, then tlic. secorld and t h e  last 
terrris from t h e  right hand side of (19) d '  isappear. 
Flo~\l  of money is considered separately, although we could marlage i t  siinilarly t o  other  
resources utilizing framework of contracts. T h e  profit d r ( t )  of agent p, is expressed as the  
diffcrcnce between amount of money received from supplier contracts arid arnount spent 
or1 production and consumption (9),(15),(18): 
If r* is t h e  tax  level on profit and p the  money return from agent activities outside the  
rnoclel then considering relations (13),(14) for money borrowing t h e  money fio\v becomes: 
Kote Ihilt there are constraints (5) on the admissible values of available resources and 
rnoncy, most notably nonnegativity constraints. It may happen that sorne of these con- 
straints are not satisfied by pair (w,(t + l ) ,  d,(t + 1))  defined by equations (19),(21), i.e. 
Tor some j .  This means that  current production strategy of agent p, is not compatible 
with current contract set. New contracts should be made and/or old contracts changed 
according to rules described in the following sections. 
4.8 Strategies of agents 
Each i i n ~ e  period t the agents decide which decisions to take. These decisioris involve 
procluction/investment plan, consumer and supplier contracts arid offers to other agents. 
111 our notations oflccrs G'i(t) of the agent p, can be described by the set of prospective 
contracts 
\vliich define the amount ~ ~ ~ ( 7 )  of resource vk with attributes r J k ( r )  and uriit pricc 7 iJA17)  
\vliic.h agent pL offers to agent p, at  time 7 .  The agent p, rnay accept this offer, with 
maybe lesser quantity, and then the offer becomes the contract. 
Thus. the strategy y,(t)  of agent p, at  time t consists of the following components: 
where 
Qio(t)  - change to production/irivestment strategy: 
Sl&(t) - new consumer contracts; 
n,(t) - new supplier contracts; 
G ' , ( l )  - current offer to other agents. 
'I'lic quantities $io( t ) ,  TI$(t), rI,(t) have the structure similar tlo respc!ctive quant i -  
ties \ I r i ( 2 ) ,  n'(t), Sl;(t) which make part of the state S i ( t )  of agent p; and are described 
prevlollsly. 
The stra.tegy y ; ( t )  depends on information Fi(t) available to  agerit y ;  at time t .  Gen- 
erally t,his includes partial lmowledge about the state of the system and the strategies of 
other agents: 
The  strat,cgy y;(t. Fi(%)) is selected according to  some decision principle. Some of suc11 
decision principles are discussed in the following section. 
4.9 Performance measures and selection of strategies 
Performa,nce measures formalize such notions as mission of business unit and its perfor- 
mance. need satisfactiori for end users. Each agent pi may have rnore than one perfor- 
rliance rrleasure Oi,.(.) which are functions of the agent state and, maybc, t,he states of otlier 
agents, like in t,he case of performance measure which formalize market penetration: 
where S(t) is the  s t a t e  of t h e  system a t  t ime t .  Through t h e  slat,es perfornlance measures 
depend on the  st,rat,egies y j ( t )  of different agents. Note tha t  even i f  pesformance measuse 
of agent p; depends explicitly only on its own s ta te  S; ( t )  it still irriplicitly depends on thc  
strategies of other agents trough current contracts I I+( t ) ,  n;(t). 
.p2rriol-~g performance measures there would be measures of constrair~t  satisfaction (5), 
like riot go in debt  below certain level, or  measures of contract fulfillment. 
A agent should select strategies y;(t) in order to  obtain "good" values of its perfor- 
mance measures. Since some of them could be conflicting, there could be  clifferent notions 
of tradeoffs between different performance measures. Here a re  some esamples:  
1. Staying within desirable sets. Select strategies such tha t  
where O;,(t) a re  some desirable sets which can change with t ime.  
2. ;\/cl,,zi.miziny selected criterion with constraints on others. Suppose t,ha,t there  is one 
" the  ;riost important" performance measure Bio(.), like, for example; net profit. T h e n  t h e  
ohJect,ivc of t h e  agent pi may be to maximize the  value of this nicasure wit,h constrair~ts 
or1 all otllers. In case when current strategy affects only cur rc i~ t  period ("myopic" case) 
the  problem becomes: 
LIuc.11 rnore often, howcver, t h e  current strategy afFects t,he fut,urc st at cs. 111 ( t ~ i s  case 111c 
problem of strategy selection may become 
u tT(S(~) )  E O i r ( ~ ) ,  r = 1 : n,, t 5 T 5 t + T (29 )  
!,here may be different dynamic formulations, like maximizat,ion of select,ctl crit.eriori ;it' 
t he  end of t h e  planning period of specified length. 
3. :\//azimizing integrated criterion. This is t h e  case when t,l-ierc is 110 criterion of 
paramount importance,  but all criterions have their relative weights A,. In myopic ca.se 
such t.radeoff strategies can be selected by solving t h e  problem 
4.  Principles of game theory. T h e  principles (25)- (30) are  sufficient for situations 
wlieli t,he s t a t e  of a agent p; does not depend considerably on tlie strat,egies of other 
a.gents; for example the  agent pi holds a monopoly on some irnport,ant procluct/servic:e. 
Generally. however. the  performance measures of different agents depend considerably 
~ I I  t'lie strat,egies of other agents. Game theory developed different not,io~is of strategy 
selectior~ in such conditions. 
For cxaniple, in fiercely competitive environment the worst case or minimax strategy 
rllay give bet,t,er rcsults then (25)-(30).  It select the  best st,rat,egy for agent pi in t h c r ~  case 
wl~eri the stratcgies of all other agents are aversive. In the case (28),(%!)) this leads to 
solut,ion of the following problem: 
I n  t lle case when environment is a mixture of competition and cooperation other strategies 
rllay prove to be more advantageous, like Pareto strategzes and coul7tzon strtltegzes. 
4.10 Coalitions of agents 
Agents may make a coalition in order to  improve their performance measures. Generally, 
[..tiere nlay be more than one coalition among agents. Coalitions E k ,  k = 1 : I { ,  are subset,s 
of t.he set of agents P and make a partition of this set: 
Agents belonging to the same coalition select their strategies according to common deci- 
sion principles and exchange information. There may be different types of coalitions, sornc 
of them being outlawed by regulating authority. Generally, coalitions arc: described by 
type of information on which their common strategies depencl and by decision principles. 
Let us describe one such type of coalition. 
Cotilltion o t  equu,l trusting agents in adverse environment. 
111 such Ek each agent knows the strategies, performa~~ce nleasures a.rlcl st.al,es 
of otlier agents belonging to  coalition plus some information about tlie st,ate of o1,tier 
agcrit,~. but nothing about their performance measures and st,rat,ogies of agents not in- 
volved in t.he coalition: 
In this case the decision principle can be Pareto optimality within coalition and minimax 
approacli toward outsiders. In case of criterion (28),(29) each agent belonging t,o coalition 
solves the followirig problem. 
O,,(S(r)) E O;,(T), r = 1 : n,, t 5 T _< t + T  ( 3 4 )  
where by pmax we clenoted Pareto maximum. 
Coalitions may change their composure due to decisions of particular agents to  join 
other coalitions or play on their own accord if they discover that such action improves 
thcir performance measures. Procedures of coalition formation and dissolving shoulcl be 
specified. 
4.11 Contract adjustment 
This is donc when current available resources ( w , ( t  + l ) , d , ( t  + 1 ) )  obtained according 
( 1 9 ) . ( 2 1 )  to do not satisfy constraints (5) and this can not be adjusted by making new 
consumer contracts according to offers G , ( t )  advanced by other agents. This situation may 
occur, for example, when end users decided to  terminate some contracts. 'I'kien current 
contracts and/or production policy should he changed in order to allow the current state 
of the agent p, reenter into admissible set. Contract adjustment brings about penaltic.s 
\vhich are reflected in tlie money flow. 
4.12 Evolution of the system 
No\\. we are ready to  describe the time evolution of the simulatiori model defined in the 
pre\,ious sections. 
IiziLinlization. At time t = 0 initial states S,(O) are assigned to  all agents and simula- 
t,iori iterval [0, TI is selected. 
Gener ic  step. At the beginning of time period t agents are in t,hc states S i ( t )  and tlie 
cr~rrent set of agents P ( t )  is divided in coalitions E k ( t ) ,  k = 1 : I<,(t) .  The following 
act ions are performed during the step t :  
1.  Sew agents are introduced and, possibly, some old agents arc eliminated wl-iich 
changes the set of agents to  P(t  + 1 ) .  
2.  Ne\v coa.litions are formed or old coalitions are confirmed which brings the coalition 
set to  L k ( t  + l ) ,  k = 1 : K c ( t  + 1 ) .  
:3 .  By oacll agent pi E P ( t  + 1 )  the following actions are perlorrnetl: 
- Irifornlatiori Fi(t) is obtained according to  participation in coalition; 
- Strategy yi is selected according to  one of decision principles discussetl a.bove in cori- 
cordance with other coalition partners. This strategy involves rnaliing ofFer l o  other 
agents. selection of new consumer and supplier contracts and atlj~~strnent, of produc- 
t ion/investrnont plan. 
- S e \ v  st,ate S,(L + 1 )  is cornputed according to ( 1 9 ) , ( 2 1 ) .  If  i t  erit,crs in atl~nissible set 
I hen go t,o step t  + 1. If not, try to reenter in admissible set by modifying strategy and/or 
c.lirrc:rit cor~tract~s. I f t.his is impossible then this agent is eliminated on the next step. 
5 Summary 
\Aie presented here a general methodology for modeling of complex clistributed multiagent 
systcms arid presented a prototype of the simulator INFOGEN for sirnulation of such 
sgPstrins. LVr had as reference point its application to  modeling of information industry, 
althollgli it is applicable for also for other multiagent systems. 
'l'liere are still many research issues to be clarified. As we have seen multiagent systems 
exhibit widely different dynamics under different values of system palameters. It would 
hc highly desirable to  develop tools which would permit to  identify regions of stability 
of ccrtaiii equilibrium points and regions where one strategy is superior ~v i th  respect to  
aiiother strategg.. Itight now we can do this only by trial and error which is very ineffective. 
One possibility t o  develop such tools is to  extend to  the multiagent systems the theory of 
sensitivity analysis developed for Discrete Event Dynamic Systems [%, 1.3. 17, 19,  24,  261. 
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